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Environmental Risk and the
Traditional Sector Approach: Market Efficiency
at the Core of Environmental Law?
John Martin Gillroy*
Introduction
Environmental risk presents public decision-makers with a near zero
probability of producing an infinitely catastrophic outcome. Thus,
environmental risk problems are called zero-infinity dilemmas. Does
one regulate risk in anticipation of unlikely catastrophe, or does one
allow environment risks and deal with hazards remedially?
The choice is value dependent. Is the use value of accepting risk as
important as preventing any harm that may be caused? Are risks,
benefits, and/or harms, of symmetric weight? Can they be traded off?
Are those imposing risk the same people who will benefit? Are they the
same people who will suffer any catastrophic consequences? Does nature
have instrumental or intrinsic value?
Answering questions such as these requires assigning values to risks,
humans and nature, and then deciding between them. Policy makers
must establish a moral standard that defines what is most
fundamentally at stake. They must establish the core principle which
will determine what is valued and how.1 But before deciding what
* John Martin Gillroy is John D. MacArthur Professor of Environmental Policy and
Law, in the Environmental Studies Program, Bucknell University. He holds a Ph.D.
(Political Science) from the University of Chicago and an M.S.E.L. (Environmental
Law) from Vermont Law School. He also holds Master's degrees from the University
of Chicago (Social Science) and Queen's University (Canadian Political Studies).
1 I use "principle" in the singular because I contend that in making collective
decisions about policy and law, one must be fair and consistent to all constituents over
time. Without this consistency, expectations could not be created, and no one could
define or anticipate administrative requirements. Therefore, while one may consider
many values in making collective choices, one must, in the end, consistently trump all
others. This trump card becomes the core principle of the dominant policy argument
for any area of policy/legal choice. Unless one either sacrifices consistency, or assumes
that one value will never conflict with another, then a dominate core principle will
emerge, over time, to define "conventional" environmental law. While it is possible for
a competing argument to replace a conventional one, this takes great effort and
political capital.
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principle ought to define environmental risk, they must first understand
what principle presently determines our perception environmental risk.
According to Campbell-Mohn, 2 the current application of
principle to policy poses many problems. Despite ever-growing public
and private expenditures to implement environmental law, surprisingly
few actual improvements occur. Often, spending large sums has only
kept problems from worsening. Meanwhile, the gap between
environmental quality and objectives widens. Congress responds to
environmental problems by adding more fixes and creating an acropolis
of administrative structures. Still, the administrative capacity to resolve
environmental problems diminishes. Eventually, administrative
institutions become overwhelmed by the piecemeal approach. 3
If the current law defining our relationship with nature is not
achieving the optimum level of environmental quality (e.g. if it merely
chases pollution without prevention or remediation and is inadequate to
the task of defining significant risk to human or ecosystem health), then
the fundamental principle upon which our law is built may need
reconsideration and reform. Most critically, the fundamental principle
that sets the standards for "persuasive" policy argument and
"reasonable" law may need to be changed.
Some, to improve the general state of affairs, blame government
regulation and argue for abandonment of "command and control" if
favor of more efficient market mechanisms. 4 If efficiency had not
determined policy to date, this might be reasonable. But I argue that it
is, and has always been, a core principle. 5 To introduce more market
mechanisms would only add fuel to fire.
2 Celia Campbell-Mohn et al., Environmental Law from Resources to Recovery
(1993).
3 Id., at vi4
4 See Terry L. Anderson & Donald R. Leal, Free Market Environmentalism
(1991); Stephen Breyer, Breaking The Vicious Circle (1993).
5 One might argue that, say, the Endangered Species Act (16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1531-
1544) (ESA) provides an exception to my claim that market assumptions and
efficiency are foundations of environmental law. Yet, I argue that market efficiency
considerations appear throughout the ESA. For example, in the determination of
"critical habitat" (§ 1533 (b)(2)); in the establishment of the Endangered Species
Committee (N 1536 (e)-(p)); and in the allowances for economic hardship exemptions
(§ 1539 (b)), to name only a few. Even within the Congressional Findings section of
the statute that outlines the reasons for the act, only one of six values ("ecological"
1531 (a) (3)) can be said to have a completely non-market definition.
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Before we make judgments about the future; make new models and
solutions6 and envision the requirements of any alternative principle
for environmental risk law and policy; construct competing arguments
for what is "truly" at stake in risk decision-making, 7 we need to
understand how the principle of efficiency has shaped the way we view
the environment and conceptualize our place within it. Specifically, we
need to understand how a concern for economic efficiency has created
the environmental risk law we now have.
If we assume that any policy paradigm 8 has a core principle which
orders and values the components of the physical world into a context
model for that paradigm, then the context model for the market
argument applied to environmental law can be characterized as the
Traditional Sector Approach (TSA). This model is a creature of an
economic core seeking efficiency where the environmental institutions,
laws and policies are actually focused on the economy and its survival in
the face of pollution and risk externalities. Two versions of the
traditional sector approach are distinguished. How each of these
traditional sector approaches are permutations of the search for
efficiency applied to environmental risk are described in unregulated
markets (TSA-I) and then within the context of government regulation
(TSA-II). In describing these models, the changing role of efficiency as
a determinant of environmental law and administration through
6 Campbell-Mohn's solution, on the other hand, requires a conceptual re-
orientation away from a concentration on individual media or sectors of the
environment (land, water, air etc.) to a consideration of the economic process as a
series of interfaces between human action and nature, beginning with the extraction of
resources from the environment and ending with their reintegration into nature
(supra note 2, at Chapter 10). "Unlike traditional approaches to environmental law
that either explain each statute or group the statutes by media, this [argument] reflects
the fact that laws govern activities, not the environment. It develops a new approach,
called resource to recovery, that explains all the laws that apply to an activity, from the
time resources are allocated for extraction, through their manufacture into products,
and on to their disposal." See Campbell-Mohn, supra note 2, at ziL
7 See John Martin Gillroy, Environmental Justice From Human Autonomy
(Forthcoming) for a complete Kantian argument, propounding that the intrinsic value
of humanity and nature that ought to set the standards for environmental law and
policy.
8 Let us define a policy paradigm as a theoretical framework for understanding the
world based upon assumptions about nature, individuals, collective action and the role
of the state, that are taken for granted as valid. For a good discussion of this sense of
paradigm, see Jong S. Jun, Public Administration Chapter 4 (1986), and Gillroy,
supra note 7, at Chapter 3.
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reference to fundamental cases and statutes are examined. This enables
one to chart a conceptual history of environmental risk law and to
understand the persistence of the principle of efficiency and its TSA in
shaping environmental law.
Efficiency and Environmental Law
The first premise of our argument about the conceptual core of
environmental risk law and policy is that it was preceded by the meta-
policy 9 of economic growth and prosperity where market
assumptions and principles held pride of place. 10 The dominant ethic
of the first hundred years of our nation's history concerned growth,
expansion, and private wealth maximization. This caused us to
conceptualize the environment as a source of resources and a receptacle
for waste as the American economy expanded. This conceptualization
also created the institutions and administrative apparatus of
environmental and resource regulation; including the present less than
fully effective and uncoordinated policy map. 11
According to Posner, 12 the core of economic efficiency as a
motivating principle is its focus on the welfare preferences of the
individual consumer and their wealth maximization. He argues that this
definition of efficiency is compatible with the Kaldor Criteria, and the
basic assumptions of cost-benefit methodology. 13 Posner contends
that this principle lies at the core of economic policy and that it has an
ethical imperative in the search for maximizing private and social
prosperity through law.
Applied to the context of nature, the goal of creating a national
economy and expanding westward can be seen as motivated and
justified by the principle of market efficiency. Within the market
context, all goods and services can be substituted for one another.
Trade is based on the individual's preferences and proceeds until no
further trade is profitable to anyone. Efficiency, when transferred into
9 See Giandomenico Majone, Evidence, Argument & Persuasion in the Policy
Process 146-49 (1989).
10 See Gillroy, supra note 7, at Chapter 3.
11 Campbell-Mohn has characterized it as such. See supra note 2, at vii See also
John S. Dryzek, Rational Ecology: Environment and Political Economy (1987).
12 Richard Posner, The Economics of Justice (1983).
13 The Moral Dimensions of Public Policy Choice: Beyond The Market Paradigm
6-13 (John Martin Gillroy & Maurice Wade, eds. 1992).
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the public realm from the market, gives government the imperative to
mimic what the market would do were it able to function and seeks the
efficient level of collective (or in this case environmental) goods.
This brings us to the first sector model, TSA-I. In this model, the
market dominates policy space and the natural environment is simply
one of its sub-systems. As we can see in Figure 1, the core of economic
policy, which is set-up to expand the market and produce prosperity, is
maximum efficiency. This core principle values everything
instrumentally as it contributes to growth and the production of
CCwanted" things. From the market standpoint, the earth can be
described as a wealth of raw material which gives no utility to the
consumer in its "raw" state. Therefore, the imperative is to transform as
much of this raw material as possible into products and services to
improve the economy and maximize the collective wealth.
Figure 1
Traditional Sector Approach I
THE MARKET
SNATURE'S A NATURE'S
SPECIES - Government MEDIA
PLANTS WATER
ANIMALS AIR
Efficiency Means the Maximum Use of the Environment, with Government
Assitance - To Both Extract Resources and Use Media as Disposal Sinks
The imperative of Kaldor efficiency is to maximize social benefit
over cost. The reality of the expanding economy in the 19th and early
20th Centuries was characterized by the perceived zero cost of both
environmental media as sinks, and virgin materials as resources. This
zero price for raw materials, and the government's concern to get as
much land and resources into private hands as possible, encouraged the
market system to absorb as much raw materials into the economic
process as its technology could consume and transform.
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To facilitate an expanding economy we divided nature into its
separate species, minerals and media; and sought an economic use for
each. We found immediate tangible market value in some (e.g. timber
and fur), and potential in others (e.g. ore), but ultimately we sought
only maximum use for market value. This search for efficient and
maximized use of nature, created the foundation for present
environmental law, policy and institutions.
In addition to the categorization of species and minerals as "natural
resources," this expansion of prosperity also conceptualized the use of
air, water, and land for the disposal of wastes as a "legitimate" use of
nature for the facilitation of efficiency. The near-zero price of resources
was matched by the perceived zero cost of waste disposal affecting
water, air, and land. Nature presented a bottomless capacity as both an
inventory of raw materials to generate wealth and a sink for the free
disposal of waste. The imperative to seek maximum benefit was
therefore aided by the zero price at both ends of the economic process:
extraction and disposal.
TSA-I can be described as a market-driven model where the
perception of a boundless and inexpensive nature, combined with the
driving force of the normative standard of efficiency, 14 encourages the
maximum use of nature to fuel economic progress. In this drama, the
government plays the role of making nature available to the economic
process, facilitating private commerce and technological innovation.
Yet, by the late 19th Century the perception of the free use of the
environment was changing. As technology allowed for greater and
faster resource use, concerns arose about long-term sustainable
efficiency and the supply of resources. Science and technology were
assumed to be their own saviors, able to replace any raw materials that
ran out. However, for the first time long-term use of nature's species
and minerals were being considered. Meanwhile, with growing urban
density, where most production was taking place, perception of free
waste disposal also changed. Smoke, dirty water, disease, and odors of
industrialization caused concern that long-run maximum production
created more use of environmental media as sinks than was optimal.
14 Normative in the sense that it set the standards by which public choice and action
are judged, justified, and evaluated.
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From the market point of view, the over use of near zero price of
species, minerals, and media in TSA-I, combined with the unregulated
advancement of technology caused market failure due to overuse.
Without the true price of resources and pollution reflected in the
economic calculation of efficiency, and with the growing sophistication
of technology, the market failed to take all the necessary contingencies
into account while maintaining long-term efficiency. This resulted in
too much extraction from the environment and introducing too much
pollution back into the system. 15 When the collective goods nature of
public policy problems causes market failures and the true price of an
item is not reflected in its market value, then the role of the
government in an efficiency-based regime, is to mimic the market and
allocate accordingly, maximizing social benefit over cost.
Instead of allowing the market to set the maximum rate of
extraction from, and disposal into the environment, the government
should compensate for market failure and set optimal rates of
extraction and disposal based on available technology and the natural
contingencies of species, minerals, and media. This brings us to the
second variant of the traditional sector approach.
In the TSA-II model, instead of having many arrows of extraction
and disposal which appear in TSA-I, TSA-II has a single controlled rate
of extraction and disposal. The control rate is regulated by government
based upon the demands of a materials balance. TSA-II embodies the
concept that for each species and mineral a single optimal rate of
extraction has been deciphered and for each media a corresponding rate
of disposal has been set. In effect, efficiency is defined not in terms of
maximization but instead in terms of the search for optimal long-term
relationship between the economy and nature. Policy maxims define
efficiency so as to establish optimal levels of extraction, pollution and
risk. The implication is a government centered search for what
economists call the "materials balance". 16
15 Larry E. Ruff, The Economic Common Sense of Pollution in Economics of the
Environment (Robert Dorfman & Nancy S. Dorfman eds. 1977).
16 See Edwin S. Mills & Philip E. Graves, The Economics of Environmental
Quality 8-18 (2nd. ed. 1986).
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Figure 2






SETTING STANDARDS FOR OPTIMAL EFFICIENCY
The materials balance describes all of nature as an inventory of
natural resources. Based on the second law of thermodynamics (i.e. that
matter cannot be created or destroyed), the economy is assumed to
neither create nor destroy nature, but "merely" transform it. 17 All
natural material has value to the extent that it can be used to support
human life, "fulfill human values" 18 and create economic wealth. As an
expression of the principle of efficiency applied to human use of nature,
the materials balance assumes that all of nature can be considered as
either inventory, product, or waste. All material that is extracted from
the environment equals that within the capital stock of products plus
that returned to the environment as waste. This equivalence is the
"balance". All natural material is therefore a constant quantity in
fungible symmetric states of being that change form for the sake of
optimizing human economic wealth. The importance of the idea of a
materials balance, as an expression of efficiency, is the continued
presumption of use. 19 The use of nature for human wealth
17 Id., at 6.
18 David W. Pearce& R. Kerry Turner, Economics of Natural Resources and the
Environment 140 (1990).
19 Even "conservationist" oriented economic approaches to nature still assume use as
the primary instrumental value of all natural attributes. To make room for natural
systems with intrinsic value, we must replace the dominant argument.
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maximization accounts for each resource in terms of its form and place
in the overall consumption process (i.e. take, use, dispose).
For example, the concept of the optimal level of pollution requires
one to assume that pollution is a natural by-product of the economic
process and that this process requires that not all pollution be
controlled. Defining pollution as "damage to the environment that
impairs its usefulness to people,"20 the argument is that media (e.g.
air, water, land, groundwater) have definable tolerance levels which
cannot be stressed without the breakdown of that media in its ability to
hold and process pollution. 21
"Tolerance" however, has a more pertinent meaning in terms of the
perception of environmental quality by individual consumers. It is not
just that, say, the airshed can only absorb X amount of pollution before
it is organically incapable of absorbing any more, but also that it can
only absorb so much before consumers perceive a change in quality that
causes them to lose utility. Both of these definitions of "tolerance" have
a place in the discussion and definition of "optimal" levels of pollution.
In any case, for a market-based analysis the environment is valuable for
natural cleaning and storage. The goal of the efficient system, as
described by TSA-II, is to use this "facility" maximally without
violating tolerance levels. "Discharge of limited amounts of wastes is a
legitimate use of the absorption capacity of each environmental
medium."2 2
Environmental capacity to hold and purify pollution is examined
against the backdrop of the demands of maximizing individual wealth,
which requires as many individuals as possible to avoid the costs of
pollution control. If each attempt to avoid pollution costs the
individual, and all efforts to control pollution are not necessary to
preserve the minimal functioning of environmental media, then one
must minimize the costs of pollution control to the economy. Such
minimization is accomplished by allowing the maximum amount of
pollution possible, while abating just enough so as not to exceed the
tolerances of these media as storage and purification devices. 23
20 Mills & Graves, supra note 16, at 18.
21 Robert E. Goodin, The Politics of Rational Man, at 175-6 (1976).
22 Mills & Graves, supra note 16, at 19.
23 See both Anthony C. Fisher, Resources and Environmental Economics (1981)
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The concept of setting optimal levels of extraction and pollution
and maintaining a material balance emphasizes, again, the instrumental
value of the environment to humanity. Use by species, mineral, and
media is the imperative and efficiency the driving principle. The
qualitative state of a natural entity or system does not matter, as long as
that state serves long-term wealth accumulation. Here the economy
neither destroys nor creates but merely transforms trees into lumber or
tigers into coats.
Within both TSA-I and II, efficiency remains the core principle of a
regulated government market and the basis for environmental law.
First, efficiency is the foundation for law and policy of natural resource
extraction in the search for optimal efficiency regarding the use of
nature's raw materials. Second, efficiency produces law and policy of
pollution and risk abatement as the government regulated market seeks
the optimal level of contamination. Both models of the traditional
sector approach promote the dissection of nature into tangible
economic values (i.e. raw materials and absorbent media); the models
differ in the connotation of the principle of efficiency.
In TSA-I, efficiency is wealth maximization in a world of zero price
for the environment. The principle is defined by market imperatives
that co-opt the government to encourage and facilitate the maximum
use of nature by keeping prices low or non-existent and
providing/protecting technological innovation and infrastructure (e.g.
trails, canals, timber roads, legal patents, etc.). Within TSA-II,
efficiency is conditioned by the imperative to seek optimal, not
maximum, rates of extraction and pollution. In TSA-IJ, the
government has the role of compensating for market failure and
defining the "optimal" rates of use and disposal in order to maintain a
regulated "materials balance" over time.24
Focusing on environmental risk law and policy from the viewpoint
of market efficiency, TSA will allow one to see how this principle
dominates legal discourse and risk decision-making.
and Kenneth M. Stokes, Man and the Biosphere: Toward a Coevolutionary Political
Economy (1994).
24 The TSA models create a world where resource and pollution issues are separate
concerns. It is not surprising that from this model two areas of law, one devoted to
resources and the other to pollution and risk abatement, have developed.
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From Traditional Pollution to Risk Abatement
A very important area of environmental law, not yet fully
understood or regulated, concerns environmental risk. Talbot Page2 5
has distinguished environmental risk as a policy issue versus traditional
pollution problems in terms of its pervasive uncertainty and the
management difficulties presented to a decision-maker trying to
regulate a near zero probability of an infinitely catastrophic harm.
2 6
The regulatory structure of risk law, as present practice, is a direct
outgrowth of market assumptions and the TSA context model. Risk
regulation, as a meta-policy issue, is like natural resources and pollution
abatement law2 7 built upon the core principle of efficiency and the
evolution of its definition from maximization under TSA-I to
optimization under TSA-II.
The issues surrounding risk regulation put the problems of an
efficiency-based environmental law into relief. A core of efficiency has
led to a counterintuitive and harmful treatment of environmental risk.
Specifically, in terms of the burden of proof being placed upon
regulators; the defense of economic markets in the face of zero-infinity
dilemmas; the failure to comprehensively anticipate the imposition of
risk; the demands placed upon science which it cannot accommodate;
and the overall neglect of intrinsic value in policy calculations. The law
that grows out of a concern for efficiency makes little sense when faced
with the uncertainty and management difficulties of environmental risk
questions.
Since World War II the human race has been producing natural and
synthetic chemical agents to improve wealth and welfare. 2 8 Initially, in
the U.S., these chemicals were produced with no regulation in an
atmosphere of competition to maximize their production. 29 In this era
25 Talbot R. Page, A Generic View of Toxic Chemicals and Similar Risks, 7
Ecology L.Q. 207 (1978).
26 See id., at 208-216 for a complete examination of the characteristics of the zero-
infinity dilemma and how environmental risk is distinct from traditional pollution
cases.
27 See Gillroy, supra note 7, at Chapter 2, for a more complete argument that
efficiency has determined both natural resources law and pollution abatement law.
28 See Cathy Trost, Elements of Risk (1984), for a history of the synthetic
chemical industry in the United States.
29 Id. and Robert V. Percival et al., Environmental Regulation: Law, Science, and
Policy, at 435 (1992).
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of TSA-I, risk agents were produced to create and expand markets for
themselves and to increase prosperity and quantity of product. During
this era, the stealth characteristics of environmental risk allowed
individuals to ignore the effects these agents had in contaminating the
environment around them.
In 1962, this attitude toward the environment changed with the
publication of Silent Spring3 0 Although the specific concern of this
book was the toxic effects of pesticides, all chemical agents being
produced within the economy became a concern for the general public.
Before Silent Spring, the positive welfare effects of risk agents were
assumed to far outweigh any hazard. However, as the calculation of
social utility changed, and many began to appreciate that the risks may
indeed be real and harmful, risk issues shifted from being considered
primarily private market transactions to subjects of "public interest" and
deliberation. In issues as diverse as mining for radioactive chemicals,
nuclear energy, and the chemical content of food, a growing public
concern required a redefinition of efficiency in order to maintain the
core standard of risk meta-policy. The new conceptualization came in
the form of a shift to TSA-II and its substitution of optimal risk, with
its market assumptions and goals, for maximum risk.
Although risk regulation is multi-faceted, with many agencies and
bodies of law controlling various sectors of risk production and storage,
the legal debate over the shift from TSA-I to TSA-II is evident and
ongoing throughout. Based upon an economic definition of a risk as "a
known probability" of harm and a market definition of rationality as
the ability to accept or decline risk in terms of individual preference,
(where environmental risk has no special character but is symmetric
with all other risks, like driving a car or walking across a street) courts
and public managers searched for the optimally efficient risk as that
which was "reasonable" given the core status of markets and wealth
maximization 31 in their assumptions about us and our social priorities.
It is this characterization of environmental risk that has provided the
standards and language for the legal, political, and policy deliberations
about risk regulation. This characterization also makes the core principle
30 Rachel Carson, Silent Spring (1962).
31 Posner, supra note 12, at 60, for a more complete explanation of this term and
its association with Kaldor efficiency.
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of efficiency manifest in the legal search for a "reasonable" amount of
risk in the environment. Let us remember that the economic approach
to environmental risk assumes that the markets that generate risk are
important to us and therefore have a moral standing prior to most
environmental considerations. Since the market has already decided
whether a certain risk ought to be accepted, the question becomes how
much risk, and what kind, ought to be allowed so that an optimal
amount is established as part of the greater materials balance.
The assumption is that risk is part of life, all risk is of symmetric
instrumental value, and that individual preferences in the market should
be the only valid means of regulation for existence of risk-producing
technology. The shift from TSA-I to TSA-I, which is a reaction to the
consciousness of excess environmental risk on the part of the public,
does not seek to replace market efficiency in the definition of risk or
the assumptions about its economic value. The only thing that changes
is the realization that too much risk could be produced by the economy
and regulation is necessary to optimize it so that its social costs will not
outweigh its benefits to consumers.
Environmental Risk, Efficiency and the Federal Courts
Let us begin our examination of the shift from TSA-I to TSA-II
with a chain of federal court cases3 2 that trace the judiciary's struggle
to establish the standards for optimal or "reasonable" environmental
risk. The point of departure for this investigation is the case of Reserve
Mining Co. v. EPA.33 In Reserve Mining,3 4 the court decided how
to regulate dumping of mining by-products into the air and water in
and around Lake Superior. In this case, the court made two decisions
addressing efficiency, maximization, and optimal efficiency. First, it
ruled that agency Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) expertise
was sufficient to establish that Reserve Mining was producing too much
risk. Second, the court concluded that the economic costs of
immediate intervention, even with the existent hazard, would cause
32 My arg ment is that the following cases provide the critical links in a chain of
reasong that has established our common law of risk regulation.
33 Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F2d. 492 (8th Cir. 1975).
34 Percival et al., supra note 31, at 442-3. For an analysis of this case and the role of
science and ethics in the law, see Robert V. Bartlett, The Reserve Mining
Controversy (1980).
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grave market costs. Therefore, in its remedy, the court decided against
closing down the company and instead instituted a "reasonable time"
to find alternative ways for disposing of mining operation by-products.
The court in Reserve Mining gave EPA the sole authority to decide
when an unregulated market had produced too much risk. In our
terms, the judiciary established that EPA would be decisive in
establishing the demarcation line between TSA-I and TSA-II for
environmental risk issues. In addition, once EPA had established that
TSA-I was no longer an acceptable context model for meta-policy, the
type of regulation considered "reasonable" by preserving the economic
market and the specific industry involved in risk production. The court
rejected the idea that the excess risk required closing the company or at
least reconsidering the role of the risk producing product for the
society-at-large and instead assumed that as long as Reserve Mining
made a "good faith" effort to dispose of its waste in a better
manner,3 5 that the economy should proceed with as little interruption
as possible.
The court in Reserve Mining recognized that "risk", unlike
traditional pollution problems, presents a potential hazard rather than
an actual one. The opinion in this case addresses the fact that prevention
requires ex ante regulation of risk.3 6 However, once it confirms the
agency's power to set the TSA-I/TSA-II threshold for risk, the court
considered the protection of human or natural integrity to be secondary
to the persistence of the market. For the first time, courts established
that when EPA declares TSA-I to be inadequate, the search for optimal
risk is ruled by the overriding consciousness that market persistence is
of primary "trump" importance.
In this decision, the court did not mandate a specific methodology
by which EPA should determine the existence of excess risk as a
prerequisite for declaring that TSA-I was invalid for policy argument
necessitating TSA-II. The court seemed to say that assessment of risk
was not a matter of objective or quantitative science but a policy matter
that ought to be left to the discretion of the agency. Although the court
35 Id. The "good faith" effort included a $34 million air pollution control program,
a $100,000 contribution to the construction of a water filtration plant, and
construction of land disposal facilities.
36 Id.
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recognized that risk was a distinct and harmful reality in the realm of
pollution abatement, it also recognized that risk production was
simultaneously so established in our economy, and uncertain, that true
remedies for protection against excess risk would require drastic (and
inefficient) disruptions in the market economy (e.g. shutting down
industry, banning products, processes, etc.).
Although the trial court ordered the plant closed, on appeal, the
plant was allowed to continue. In a seeming contradiction of findings
about the potential harms of environmental risk, the federal court
allowed the company time to stop its air and water discharges as if
environmental harm were insignificant rather than irreversible, latent,
and potentially catastrophic. The court was persuaded by the argument
that an individual working for the company would face more certain
harm from unemployment than from environmental risk.37
The court's allowance of Reserve Mining's continued operation, in
the face of a zero-infinity dilemma, makes sense only if the court saw
itself as preserving efficiency in the face of a necessity to establish
government supervision of risk markets. If this decision is the evolution
of optimal from maximum efficiency then it is logical for the courts to
charge the EPA experts with establishing the line between TSA-I and
TSA-II. At least risk, as well as the threshold for market failure, and the
establishment of TSA-II, were considered policy questions and the
responsibility of EPA. This, however, would soon change.
Ethyl Corp. v. EPA3 8 the next legal case built upon the findings
of Reserve Mining. This case redefines EPA's authority in deciding
when too much risk exists. The Reserve Mining court was willing to
allow EPA to establish the point at which maximizing efficiency had to
be replaced with optimizing efficiency. However, in Ethyl Corp the
court decided that the EPA's responsibilities acquired more restrictive
requirements. The court followed Reserve Mining and held that risk
did not have to cause actual harm to be regulated. The court required
the agency to make a specific connection between the probability of risk
and the severity of the harm it causes. 3 9
37 Thomas M. Hoban & Richard 0. Brooks, Green Justice 49 (1987).
38 Ethyl Corp. v. EPA 541 F.2d 1, (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc). See Percival et al.,
supra note 29, at 444-45.
39 Percival et al., supra note 29, at 445.
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To regulate environmental risk, the Administrator was required to
establish a "fixed probability of harm" defined by the severity of the
potential harm and its specific probability of occurrence at dangerous
levels. 40 The variety and severity of risks are now being considered in
terms of when too much risk is really present. Whereas the shift from
TSA-I to TSA-II, which allows government regulation of risk markets,
requires proof and not just expertise. In both Ethyl Corp and Reserve
Mining, the court was hoping to maintain the definition of efficiency
as maximization (TSA-I) as long as possible. Whereas in the first
decision, the courts allowed EPA to declare TSA-II to be in effect and
then minimized its power by allowing a liberal interpretation of the
concept of "optimal". In Ethyl Corp, the court preempted EPA's
declaration against TSA-I until the specific severity of the risk and its
specific probabilities were completely examined. 4 1
The Supreme Court in Industrial Union Department AFL-CIO v.
American Petroleum Institute ("Benzene case") moved to TSA-114 2
by limiting the discretion of EPA to unilaterally redefine efficiency as
optimality. The Benzene case concerns the Occupational Safety &
Health Administration's (OSHA) efforts to set an acceptable benzene
level for exposed workers. Instead of either deferring to EPA expertise
in deciding when maximum risk should be replaced by optimal risk (as
in Reserve Mining), or establishing general guidelines requiring agency
substantiation of excess environmental risk (as in Ethyl Corp) the
Supreme Court required that EPA set an absolute threshold of "safety"
before it can, in effect, replace maximum with optimal efficiency or
move to regulate markets for risk.
The Benzene case established a definitive threshold between TSA-I
and TSA-II. It required that the regulators persuade the court that
efficiency defined as maximization had produced too much risk and
that harm was real before government intervention in risk markets was
40 Id., at 444.
41 For a cost benefit model that agrees with this mandate, see Page, supra note 25.
In addition, it should be noted that this mandate by the court helped EPA to declare
TSA-II in effect and adopt a very conservative definition of optimal in the case of
lead. It is less certain that, if the suspected toxic did not have the certainty of harm
represented by lead, "maximization" would have remained the pertinent definition of
efficiency.
42 Industrial Union Dep't. AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607(1980). See Percival et al., supra note 29, at 457-477.
Gillroy: Market Efficiency at the Core of Environmental Law 155
acceptable public policy. Only after the threshold finding establishes
that the definition of efficiency as maximization is posing a "significant
harm" can the Administrator, now within TSA-II, proceed to set
parameters for optimal risk generation given the needs of the market
and the materials balance. The Industrial Union Court stated that:
43
[the] Act... requires the Secretary, before issuing any
standards, to determine that it is reasonably necessary and
appropriate to remedy a significant risk of material health
impairment. Only after the Secretary has made the
threshold determination that such a risk exists with respect
to a toxic substance would it be necessary to decide whether
[the Act] requires him to select the most protective standard
he can consistent with economic and technological
feasibility, or whether... benefits of the regulation must be
commensurate with the costs of its implementation.
[W]e think it clear that the statute was not designed to
require employers to provide absolutely risk-free workplace
whenever it is technologically feasible... so long as the cost is
not great enough to destroy the entire industry. Rather,
both the language and structure of the Act, as well as its
legislative history, indicate that it was intended to require
the elimination, as far as possible, of significant risk of harm.
Therefore, administrative agencies such as OSHA and EPA can
only regulate risk that poses an established harm. They cannot
unilaterally declare that efficiency as maximization in a free market has
become dysfunctional without first showing that the threshold between
TSA-I and TSA-II has been crossed in the form of significant public
harm.
The Supreme Court does not allow OSHA experts to employ the
methodology they see fit due to speculation that the experts may
declare TSA-I dysfunctional when it is not. In the Benzene case, the
court required that uncertainties become risks; that is, to assign
ccscientific" probability numbers to the uncertainty of harm. In effect,
the Supreme Court mandated that a specific scientific methodology,
Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) was necessary. QRA sets a
significant risk threshold where TSA-I fails and then decides on
standards for optimal risk under TSA-II. Setting this specific test
methodology seems merely an extension of the risk v. harm balancing
43 448 U.s. 607, 639-641 (1980).
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test of Ethyl Corp. For now a risk assessment is defined not as a policy
problem, but as a scientific calculation of symmetric and economically
rational probabilities.
Although the Supreme Court in the Benzene case did not mandate
cost-benefit methods and did not specifically require OSHA to
consider cost in its rule-making, by protecting TSA-I from random
regulation and mandating QRA in both setting the threshold of TSA-I
and the definition of optimal risk within TSA-II, the Court
accomplished the same end: risk efficiency. The Benzene case
established the priority of QRA in both setting the significant risk
threshold and defining optimal or reasonable risk over that threshold.
Based on the foundation of economic rationality and market efficiency
criteria, the court maintained that "safe does not mean risk-free". Here
the court accepts the economic definition of risk and gives no special
normative or empirical character to environmental risks, which it
assumes are symmetric with all other risks in one's life. 44 There are
many activities that we engage in every day (such as driving a car or
even breathing city air) that entail some risk of accident or material
health impairment; nevertheless, few people would consider those
activities safe.4 5
What we have here is the substitution of science for policy, the
replacement of deliberation and choice based on normative and
empirical considerations with a dedication to numbers and the rational
preferences connected to calculate the probability of individual
consumer's welfare. The establishment of QRA as a necessary and
sufficient condition for defining the threshold for government
interference in risk markets require science to play the role of
gatekeeper. This is to maintain the primacy of maximum efficiency as
the core principle of environmental risk meta-policy. The Supreme
Court assumes that people are economically rational consumers and
that a market for benzene is evidence of its value in terms of those
welfare preferences that set the standard for efficient and therefore
"Csocially better" policy. The moral prerogative of established economic
44 For an argument that there are normative distinctions that make environmental
risks asymmetric with other risks in one's life see John Martin Gillroy, Public Policy
and Environmental Risk: Political Theory, Human Agency, and the Imprisoned
Rider, 14 Environmental Ethics 217 (1992).
45 Percival, supra note 29, at 467.
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markets frame the deliberation of the Court and its definition of
"reasonable" law.
The Supreme Court, in approaching risk from an efficiency
standpoint, seemingly wants unregulated markets for risk (TSA-I) to be
allowed to exist in as many cases as possible. Therefore, a specific
quantitative ("scientific") test must be used so that preference
calculations can be made to establish the existence of excess risk. If it is
established that too much risk exists, then the same risk assessment
must determine the proper standards for optimal risk under TSA-II.
The court introduces QRA in defense of the market and maximum
efficiency in order to establish the "risk severity" concerns of Ethyl
Corp. in both the transition beyond TSA-I and in the definition of
optimal risk within TSA-II. Unless real harm from risk can be
established, the goal is to deter the interference of government in
private economic calculations. As the Chief Justice states, "[p1erfect
safety is a chimera; regulation must not strangle human activity in the
search for the impossible." 4 6
One year after the Benzene case, the Supreme Court in the
Cotton Dust decision, Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc. v.
Donovan,4 7 seemed to establish a mandate against the use of cost-
benefit measures in assessing risk and its remedy.4 8 Here Justice
Brennan, specifically said that EPA "was not required" to complete a
cost benefit analysis in setting its standards for cotton dust. This case is
interesting to us in that it involves a risk agent (cotton dust) with a well-
known hazard based upon scientific data. OSHA and the court agreed
that "exposure to cotton dust presents a significant health hazard to
employees" and in effect, QRA had already been used to argue that the
threshold between TSA-I and TSA-II had been crossed. The court
interpreted the statute to mean that cost-benefit was not necessary and
reaffirmed the Benzene court decision which required QRA to set a
threshold level of "significant risk".
Unlike the Benzene case, the court in Cotton Dust began their
deliberations within TSA-II in search of a standard to define the
46 448 U.S. 607, 664(1980).
47 American Textile Mfr. Inst. v. Donovan 452 U.S. 490 (1981).
48 Mark Sagoff, The Economy of the Earth 214 (1988).
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optimal level of risk. For this task the court gives OSHA the option of
cost-benefit, but requires what it calls a "feasibility analysis". 4 9
Although the specific costs and benefits of regulation do not have to be
part of the decision process for EPA, and this seems to be a step away
from efficiency-based policy, "feasibility analysis" can be seen as a type
of efficiency analysis within the context of TSA-II. It is efficient in the
same way that technological standards under the Clean Air 50 or Clean
Water 51 Acts are efficient in setting a standard for optimal pollution.
In effect, to find a feasible standard for acceptable risk, the EPA would
have to concern itself with that level of dust control not significantly
harming the business involved and achievable through existing
technology. For all practical purposes, regulatory requirements would
have to be within the "optimal" tolerance range of the markets involved.
Presumably, the Cotton Dust case is the first one in our chronology
where the transition from TSA-I to TSA-II is completed. It is an
instance where a standard is being set for a "known" excess risk. To set
this optimal level of risk the court requires an "analysis showing that
performance is possible but not an analysis comparing the cost of
compliance with the benefits." 52 Still, if "feasibility" requires that
available technology be used and that the "costs" to the market are not
excessive, then what is the real difference? In both cases, optimal
efficiency and the survival of the market dominate the decision. Both
procedures are concerned with what the market considers to be
economically and technologically "feasible". We are not concerned with
what may be feasible from the standpoint of human or natural systems
integrity, but only in terms of efficient outcomes.
The final case in this chain, NRDC v. EPA,53 deals with EPA's
regulation of risk from vinyl chloride. This case is a natural end to our
legal risk chronology as it mandates a definitive two-step test for
efficient risk regulation. The court mandated a two-step process for
regulating hazardous air pollutants by the EPA. First EPA must
49 See supra note 48, at 509.
50 42U.S.C.A. 7411 &7412.
51 33 U.S.C.A. § 1311 & 1316.
52 Roger W. Findley & Daniel A. Farber, Environmental Law in a Nutshell 187
(3rd ed. 1992).
53 NRDC v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146, (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc).
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establish an "acceptable" level of risk based solely on health
considerations before setting standards that provide for an "ample
margin of safety." In determining the ample margin of safety, the
administrator may require further reductions in emissions to consider
health risks, as well as costs and technological feasibility. 54
We should here read "health considerations" to mean the use of
QRA. The established way of assessing health risk is through QRA and
it has been codified as a specific procedure for federal agencies. 55 The
curious passage here deals with the idea that economic feasibility
criteria, found in step-two, would result in tighter regulations. It is
more reasonable to assume that consideration of technology and
economic cost would lead to more liberal standards from the market
standpoint.
This case itself involves the rendering of two decisions by the D.C.
Circuit Court: a 2 to 1 panel decision and a unanimous en banc
decision that reversed the panels findings. The panel's decision affirmed
EPA's choice to forgo a long-term zero emissions goal as its regulatory
strategy and, instead, rely on BAT technological standards which
"considers economic and technological feasibility". 56
By emphasizing available technology, the EPA has ensured the
maximum regulation against uncertainty without the economic and
social displacements that would accompany the closing of an industry
or any substantial part of an industry. "By ensuring that costs do not
become grossly disproportionate to the level of reduction achieved, the
EPA guarantees that the consuming public does not pay an excessive
price for the marginal benefits of increasing increments of protection
against the unknown." 57
The en banc court reversed the panel and held that EPA could not
"primarily" rely on BAT technology within §112 of the Clean Air Act.
54 Rosemary O'Leary, Environmental Change: Federal Courts and the EPA 110
(1993).
55 See both National Research Council, Risk Assessment In The Federal
Government: Managing The Process (1983) and Joseph V. Rodricks, Calculated
Risks: The Toxicity and Human Health Risks of Chemicals in Our Environment
(1992) for a complete explanation of QRA.
56 Percival et al., supra note 29, at 857. One could argue that this is the point of
both the Benzene and Vinyl Chloride decisions.
57 NRDC v. EPA, 804 F.2d 710, 722-723, (D.C. Cir. 1986) as quoted in Percival
et al, supra note 29, at 857.
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Instead, the court mandated a two-step process: first a finding of a
"safe level" of risk; then the consideration of technology and economic
cost to find an optimal standard for control of excess hazard.
From our point of view, this reversal does not represent an anti-
efficiency decision, but rather the recognition by the court that the
panel decision did not find the necessity of establishing a threshold
before setting an optimality standard. The en banc court reminds us
that it is unacceptable to use technological standards to regulate risk
before we have established that TSA-I has been transcended and
government-set standards are necessary (i.e. that excess risk exists).
All of the decisions in this chain demonstrate that there has been an
effort by the court, within the uncertainty of environmental risk issues,
to require that the agency first persuade the court that a "significant
risk" exists. In other words, the hazard potential of the risk is excessive
and beyond the capacity of markets to adequately regulate them. Only
when the threshold between TSA-I and TSA-II has been crossed and
has defined efficiency as optimality, is it proper to use any type of
government standard setting. Only efficiency defined as optimality
requires state regulation of markets. This logic is confirmed in the
above two-step test where step one concerns the TSA-I threshold and
step two focuses upon TSA-II standard setting.
Both of these decisions about vinyl chloride are fascinating in that,
while they specifically address the "ample margin of safety" language of
§ 112 of the Clean Air Act, they actually concern whether maximizing
efficiency has produced too much risk; and if so, what tests should
contribute to the definition of government-set optimal efficiency. The
court specifies the steps and the specific tests which agencies must use in
this determination of "reasonable risk". It is clear that the
Administrator must first determine if a "significant risk" exists before
seeking "the level of emissions that will result in an 'acceptable' risk to
health."' 5 8 These decisions are dominated by ex ante concerns for
economic rationality and risk markets. The process of risk regulation,
from the standpoint of the courts, concerns "what risks are acceptable in
the world in which we live." 59 In the vinyl chloride case, the Benzene
decision is quoted to add the economic approach to risk as the principle
58 Supra note 54, at 1164.
59 Id., at 1165.
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and theoretical assumption which is undebatedly considered valid for
both parts of the two-step process.60
In step one, QRA turns the uncertainty of harm into the probability
of environmental risk and places science in the role of gatekeeper for
efficient outcomes as it is used to guard against state involvement in
risk markets when these markets have not yet broken down. QRA is
being used to establish whether or not the prevailing definition of
efficiency as maximization has become dysfunctional, allowing excess
risk into the environment. It is incumbent upon QRA to establish that a
"significant risk" of severe harm exists. If it can not do so, then TSA-I
remains in operations and risk markets operate unencumbered.
Judicial thinking, therefore, establishes a two-step process61 where
QRA provides for efficiency in step one and cost-benefit methods
which represent efficiency as the core principle of the meta-policy in
step two. Only if QRA establishes that TSA-II is in effect, does
efficiency require cost-benefit or feasibility analysis to maintain its
status as the core principle of the meta-policy. In step two, as the state
becomes a market surrogate in the policy process, the court allows the
full use of technological and economic considerations in setting the
definition of optimal or reasonable risk. The court in the Vinyl
Chloride decision defined the second step in the two-part test to be
specifically aimed at technological and economic feasibility, thereby
routinizing the feasibility analysis first suggested in the Cotton Dust
decision six years earlier.
Two critical variables in the evolution of environmental risk law are
the rise of QRA as a requirement for the court to establish risk levels
and the judicial banishment of cost-benefit methods in the first phase
of the two-step process. QRA alone determines whether efficiency as
maximization has created too much risk. The question for this essay is
whether the legal institutionalization of QRA for the purposes of
turning uncertainty into risk probability is a departure from our
60Id.
61 This process can be argued to reflect trends in federal policy launched bytheReagan Administration (e.g. Executive Order 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981)) bt is
argued here to be the establishment, by an "independent" judiciary, of the dominance
or market assumptions in environmental risk policy choice. Here the market
assumptions that had long held pride of place in policy argument are being carried
over into the regulation of a new area of legal concern.
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contention that market efficiency is the core principle of risk abatement
meta-policy. It is argued that it is not.
QRA and cost-benefit methods are both based upon the same
definition of economic rationality and operate on the same definition
of risk as substitutable, tradable, and preference-based. 62 Both QRA
and cost-benefit methods are normative decision procedures that
employ a theory of comparative instrumental value that is necessary to
make each risk tradable with all others. Efficiency is therefore
represented by two distinct "decisionist" 63 methods that have a
common foundation of values and definitions: QRA (for step one) and
cost-benefit (for step two).
The background assumptions of the market can be seen in the rise
of quantitative risk assessment as a "scientific" basis for the assignment
of probabilities to environmental uncertainty. If we characterize the
economic project as one allowing individuals to trade symmetric risks
in a market according to their preferences then the first thing one must
do is assign probabilities to risks so that these rational calculations can
commence. If cost-benefit method represents economic decisionism 64
in general policy argument about standard setting under TSA-IJ, then
quantitative risk assessment represents economic precepts as scientific
decisionism for establishing threshold risk.
In both "decisionist situations," the actor is a unitary decision-
maker where there is no conflict of interests or arguments but only
logic, evidence, and truth. In the present context, policy is assumed to
be applicable to proof from empirical observation and verification by
experiment. Both also see policy choice from the decision analysis
viewpoint where specific probabilities can be weighed and deliberated
before choice. 65 Both are positivist in that the methodology is claimed
to deduce conclusions from factual premises which themselves are
based on general laws, verifiable by observation and experimentation.
Additionally, both are preoccupied with instrumental value and
consequences, making no allowances for intrinsic character in either
62 This can be seen in the definition of risk quoted from the Benzene decision, see
supra note 42.
63 Majone supra note 9, at 12-15.
64 Id., at Chapter 1.
65 Id.
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evaluation or justification. In short, both cost-benefit methods and
quantitative risk assessment are non-political, myopic, and ethically
instrumentalist.
Efficiency as maximization in TSA-I relies on QRA to protect
against instances where the market would be regulated without need; in
other words, to protect efficiency as maximization against false
positives. A fully-functional and unregulated market under TSA-I is
innocent unless QRA can prove it guilty; that is, prove that its products
or by-products subject humanity to a "significant risk of harm." In
terms of efficiency as optimality under TSA-II, the use of quantitative
risk assessment allows a more precise mathematical feel for the
"optimal" level of risk and guards against too much regulation
encumbering the market. In both steps of the risk regulation test QRA
turns uncertainty into risk by the assignment of probabilities. As long as
economic precepts provide the background assumptions within which
QRA operates, efficiency has the determinative power to utilize the
products of QRA in support of risk markets.
Although it has been argued elsewhere 6 6 that cost-benefit analysis,
although ethically impoverished, is not value-free, and while other
writers67 have argued that the "scientific" process that is QRA is also
normative in nature, it is believed that this argument has been expanded
by contending that QRA is a natural extension of cost-benefit methods,
protecting efficiency as maximization in TSA-I from false positives and
representing efficiency as optimality under TSA-II. In both instances
QRA minimizes regulation and maximizes the level of "reasonable risk"
in policy standards.
The chain of federal risk cases illustrates that, within environmental
risk regulation, there has not been a full evolution from TSA-I to TSA-
II. Even well after the publication of Silent Spring, we as a nation,
continue to argue about whether or not there is too much human-
generated risk in the natural environment.
66 John Martin Gillroy, The Ethical Poverty of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 25 Policy
Sciences 83 (1992).
67 Kristen Shrader-Frechette, Burying Uncertainty: Risk and the Case Against
Geological Disposal of Nuclear Waste (1993).
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Environmental Risk, Efficiency and the Statute Law
The power of efficiency considerations is further supported by an
examination of the statutory law of risk regulation. 6 8 The court
decisions, mandating a two-part test. First establishing whether TSA-I
still holds and then setting optimal standards for risk considering
technological and economic feasibility under TSA-II. Also, the
protection of efficiency as maximization appears to dominate risk
statutes as well.
For the purposes of argument, three distinct sets of statutes in risk
abatement law shall be defined. One group of statutes define the risk
threshold between efficiency as maximization in TSA-I and optimal
efficiency in TSA-II. Next, there are the laws attempting to provide
market solutions for the disposition of risk generated waste produced
under TSA-I. Finally, there are those laws assuming TSA-JI and seeking
to integrate risk abatement into the pre-existing regulatory regime
established to set optimal efficiency standards for traditional air and
water pollution.
These three categories show a profound effort, on the part of
legislators, to fit risk abatement into the pre-existing pollution
abatement model. The difference is the distinct management dilemma
of regulating risk and its profound uncertainty. Our task here is to
describe these statutes as they are and have been applied, and to
consider what normative principle sets the standards of success and
provides the basis for justification of the meta-policy.
The first set of statutes illustrates how policy defends TSA-I against
regulatory intervention and the application of law to the direct setting
of threshold risk standards concerning chemical agents and their
manufacture. Historically, because markets for risk are originally in
effect under TSA-I, efficiency is defined in terms of maximization.
When synthetic chemicals were first created and marketed they were
produced to maximize welfare with only market demand and
technological capabilities determining their formulation and
introduction into the environment.
68 For a more complete examination of risk statute law see Carl F. Cranor,
Regulating Toxic Substances (1993).
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However with the advent of general concern that these chemical
agents might be producing excess risk, it became necessary to write
legislation that would protect against maximum efficiency producing
too much hazard given the chemical agents economic value to our
prosperity. The two statutes written to set up the threshold between
TSA-I and TSA-II for chemical risk are the Toxic Substances Control
Act (TSCA), 6 9 and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).70
One line of argument within TSCA offers the possibility of a pre-
market testing scheme for the ex ante protection of the public health
from hazardous chemicals. However, the dominant and decisive
argument within this legislation defers to and protects an unregulated
risk market by placing the burden of proof on the EPA to demonstrate
that too much risk exists before they can issue regulations. EPA must
first test to show that unreasonable risk exists and the legislation limits
both when and what EPA can demand from the industry, which has
few pre-market requirements to account for.
The strongest part of this legislation 71 is the fact that EPA can
require the testing of a chemical agent when a "chemical may pose an
unreasonable risk to health." In language reminiscent of the risk cases
we have reviewed, EPA is required to establish a threshold of
"significant" or "unreasonable" risk, and only then can it regulate a
chemical in order to find an optimal level of environmental risk.
As one might expect in legislation built upon efficiency as
maximization, the burden of proof for finding and stopping a hazard is
entirely EPA's.7 2 It must test the chemical in terms of QRA and prove
an "unreasonable" public risk. After EPA has been notified7 3 that a
chemical will be marketed, it has little power to stop it. The
69 15 U.S.C.A. § 2601-2696.
70 7 U.S.C.A. 1 36-136y. I concentrate here on FIFRA before it was amended in
1996 by the Food Quality Protection Act. Although these amendments made some
changes in the law, the essential definition of environmental risk and the fundamental
assumptions about the application of market assumption did not change. My
argument, being about fundamental assumptions, is therefore largely unaffected. See
John Wargo, Our Children's Toxic Legacy 301-9 (Second Ed., 1998).
71 TSCA § 2603(a).
72 For a contrast between EPA risk regulation and FDA risk regulation, which shifts
this burden of proof see Gillroy supra note 7, at Chapter 10.
73 TSCA § 2604.
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Administrator can require testing mainly under emergency
circumstances, 7 4 and then only after a costly and time-consuming
process during which the manufacturer can market the chemical.
Specifically, testing must be done by EPA through the rule-making
process. 75 If tt does not commit time and energy to the investigation
of the chemical and its effects, then a potentially risk-generating
chemical will enter the market without regulation.
Therefore, the production of possible toxic chemicals proceeds in
this nation without significant pre-market regulation. Even
economists 7 6 admit that the rate of production in this market
precludes the gathering of data on all the possible hazards and that
"progress in reducing these data gaps has been quite slow."7 7
Considered from the standpoint of protecting environmental and/or
human qualities, this may seem counter intuitive, but as an expression
of protecting efficiency as maximization from the economic disaster of
a false positive risk assessment, it makes perfect sense.
The idea of pre-market testing in TSCA exists for one or two cases
in a thousand where a known and very dangerous chemical is proposed
for marketing. In this odd instance, the EPA can rely on pre-existing
knowledge and scientific studies and take the time to analyze the
testing and write the necessary rules that will regulate or ban these
particular agents. However, to represent and maintain the core principle
of efficiency, most chemicals are marketed first and questioned later if
over time they exhibit evidence of widespread negative health effects.
But the fact that EPA cannot begin to keep up with the testing and has
only regulated a few chemical agents implies a failure if, in fact, the
meta-policy was suppose to protect ecosystems and regulate the
economy ex ante. However, if TSCA is there to allow the free
functioning of the market, it will only fail in that rare instance when a
chemical blatantly produces too much health hazard for its economic
value. As a result, the statutes' failure to regulate this market is, by
market efficiency standards, a success.
74 TSCA § 2607(e).
75 TSCA § 2603.
76 Michael Shapiro, Toxic Substances Policy, in Public Policies for Environmental
Protection (Paul R. Portey ed., 1990).
77 Id., at 236.
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TSCA is an expression of the principle of efficiency in risk
regulation where the uncertainty of hazard must be proven, and the
threshold between TSA-I and TSA-II is not yet crossed. The second
piece of legislation, designed to license the commercial use of poisons as
pesticides, helps to define this threshold more succinctly as it
simultaneously examines the question of "optimal" risk under TSA-II.
Given the known hazards, FIFRA7 8 is more restrictive than TSCA
and is concerned with an optimal level of pesticide production.
However, it is contended that in designing and implementing FIFRA,
EPA has maximized the scope of an efficient risk market within TSA-I.
This particular risk market deals with poisonous substances that are
intended to kill plant life, and have been known to take unintended
human and animal victims. Therefore, it is reasonable and efficient in
this case to have the manufacturers of these substances acquire a license
in order to market their chemical pesticide. FIFRA protects the market
by not allowing EPA to make any judgments about the need for a
particular product, or its comparative safety with other products in the
field. Regulators within FIFRA can only demand that minimum
requirements be met. In addition, EPA is not empowered to make any
economic judgments. As long as a potential pesticide meets minimum
functional and labeling requirements it must be licensed and allowed to
take its place in the market.
The policy history of FIFRA7 9 is a story of the growth of law from
the demands of economic prosperity and technological innovation
within agricultural markets. The efficiency of these poisons, their
comparative ease of use, and their improvement of crop yield, define
them as an issue within the law. 80 Motivated by the goal of efficient
crop yield, the administration of pesticide regulation (like the
administration of our forests) began within the U.S. Department of
Agriculture. This pride of place for efficiency within the meta-policy
78 7 U.S.C.A. § 136 et seq.
79 See Christopher Bosso, Pesticides & Politics: The Life Cycle of a Public Issue
(1987). I am told, by the author, that a revised edition of this argument is now being
written.
80 "Pesticides may have provided farmers with a new technological edge in the
battle against pests, but the economic imperatives made chemicals absolutely
necessary. The new products were relatively cheap and promised to the farmer
increased yields at lower costs. Such economic arguments were, if not totally
compelling, highly persuasive." Id., at 32.
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has caused pesticide regulation, even when transferred to the EPA in
1970, to be designed so as to foster the market while attempting to
establish safeguards against the production of excess risk.8 1
Again, like within TSCA, the safeguards exist for that rare case
when a particular chemical agent (e.g. DDT) is found to produce too
much risk for its economic benefits. In a regulatory framework where
the overwhelming imperative is to foster economic prosperity, it is only
after DDT has definitively passed over the threshold between TSA-I
and TSA-II that it qualifies for further regulation. 82 Like TSCA,
FIFRA is legislation in defense of the unregulated TSA-I market and
efficiency as maximization. The difference between the two is that the
subject of FIFRA is known poisons and therefore a degree of
uncertainty is removed from the risk calculation. Because this is a
market for poison, more risk is tolerated as a matter of course. License
requirements support a "free" market by allowing products to enter the
market as long as they meet minimum requirements. This maximizes
market entry while it sets up a mechanism where very risky poisons can
be identified and regulated. From an efficiency standpoint, this is the
measure of success for FIFRA. In both cases, regulation of chemical
agents grants the benefit of the doubt to the market and lays (all or
most of) the burden of proof on the regulatory agency. The burden of
proof is both for the charge that any chemical has or will produce too
much risk and for the degree of regulation required for that particular
poison in the environment.
In both cases, EPA cannot make any economic judgments about the
need for, or comparative safety of, any potentially toxic agent.
Therefore, EPA must allow the market to decide a chemical's fate
unless it provides such an obvious and immediately known danger that
it merits utilizing the courts and the agency's time to get it off of the
market. For example, since the passage of FIFRA in 1972, after years of
service to the economy, only DDT and ALAR have been successfully
banned from U.S. markets. DDT was the most important and widely
used pesticide in the U.S. for 30 years and it continues to be
exported. 83 The removal of ALAR from the market, after years of
81 Id., at 152-3.
82 Even at this point, after DDT was considered too risky for U.S. sale, foreign sales
were allowed to continue.
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consideration as a vital chemical to the apple industry, was due to a
voluntary withdrawal by the manufacturer due to loss of money and
market status. 84 One needs to remember that this predisposition
toward minimal interference in risk markets is a success story for the
expression of efficiency as the core principle of environmental risk law.
The second category of risk statutes concerns the attempt to find
market solutions to the transportation, disposal, and clean-up of toxic
waste. In this category, we have two legislative efforts, one an original
piece of legislation like FIFRA and TSCA and the other an attempt to
graft toxic regulation onto an existing statute. The grafted legislation is
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) which was an
amendment to the pre-existing Solid Waste Disposal Act,85 while the
original legislation is the Comprehensive Environmental Response
Compensation and Liability Act 86 (CERCLA).
In RCRA and CERCLA are found the most stringent market
measures applied to risk. They represent an effort, not only to trace all
suspected toxics from cradle to grave, but to allow those who are
"harmed" by toxic waste to sue the many "responsible parties" for
compensation. 87 Although the regulation of toxic waste under these
two legislative mandates has been criticized as heavy handed and
cumbersome, from the market point of view and the standpoint of
efficiency, one would expect that the regulation of toxic waste would
be the most cumbersome.
First, toxic waste no longer provides a positive market benefit that
increases welfare but only a negative market cost in terms of storage
and health effects. While previously, during the production phase under
TSA-I, the potential cost of risk-generating material or technology was
outweighed by its benefits in storage as waste. Risk is all external cost
and requires regulation to integrate it back into the cost of the
manufacturing process. In line with traditional pollution abatement,
where disposal involved direct release into nature at zero cost but
83 See both Bosso supra note 80 and David Pimentel & Hugh Lehman, The
Pesticide Question (1996).
84 Percival et al., supra note 29, at 490-95.
85 42 U.S.C.A. § 6901-6992k.
86 42 U.S.CA. § 9601-9675.
87 Id. § 9607.
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became regulated by public standards, with risk-generating toxins, it
has been collectively decided that these agents can no longer just be
released but must be stored and monitored. In the case of toxic waste
the TSA-I threshold has been passed and government regulation, within
TSA-II, seeking optimal levels of risk from waste and ways to
internalize externalities that are "known" hazards, has become
conventional to policy-making.
Second, the regulatory tools (statutes) that exist to set the optimal
level of risk in the economy, are efficiency-based. RCRA is no more
than sound accounting for specific wastes and the attempt to internalize
a hazardous externality through follow-up and management of the
transportation and disposal of potentially cost-generating compounds.
CERCLA has an ex post liability mechanism that assigns responsibility
to manufacturers and sends them the appropriate market signals that
allow them to anticipate cost and figure it into production. Accounting
and liability law are efficient means to measure and manage optimal
levels of risk from waste, mimic the market, and integrate the cost of
hazardous externalities.
In effect, both RCRA and CERCLA are afterthoughts of an
efficiency-based environmental law. Risk is maximized in production
within TSA-I which generates waste requiring disposal. Crossing into
TSA-II, by protecting the market against false positives, a situation has
been created where some harm will be done to individuals and nature.
The efficient answer to these problems is to adopt a strict accounting
system to track the production and allocation of potentially toxic
agents without interrupting their production, while setting strict and
several liability as a legal standard and hold producers, transporters, and
financial underwriters responsible for any harm that does befall the odd
individual. 88
Overall, the efficiency core of environmental law produces risk
within TSA-I and requires that responsibility for any future harm from
this risk be internalized into market price. RCRA and CERCLA do
this. In addition, RCRA and CERCLA try to deal with disposal
problems created by the framework of efficiency-based environmental
law, concentrating waste from air and water onto land.89 The final set
88 Percival, supra note 29, at 630-56.
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of statutes, or more properly amendments to existing statutes, attempt
to deal with risk in air and water media by grafting hazardous pollution
provisions onto preexisting legislation. Efficiency is defined in terms of
optimality under TSA-II. The concern is not for risk from market
products themselves but for risk from the by-products of
manufacturing that might contaminate our air and water.
To provide for these concerns, §11290 of the Clean Air Act 91 and
§30792 of the Clean Water Act 93 were created. In both of these cases,
technology standards are designated for "hazardous" or "toxic"
emissions. The same legislation and technological standards approach
connected with the abatement of traditional pqllution are now, without
significant amendment, being utilized in the regulation of
environmental risk. Either environmental risk is no different than
traditional cases of air and water pollution, which it is argued is false, 94
or its comprehensive quality and distinct characteristics are being
ignored in the codification of air and water risk policy. But let us begin
with the legal treatment of traditional pollutants, upon which risk
regulation is grafted.
The aim of clean air and clean water legislation is to protect the
public health and maintain a level of environmental quality that will
support productivity. 95 The objective of both pieces of legislation is
for the government to set a "shadow price" for pollution through the
establishment of standards that are specific to particular emissions in
specific air- or water-sheds. Setting an optimal level of pollution is
89 "The hazardous waste problem faced by the United states is a by-product of an
advanced economy and technological life-style. It is also the result of our other
environmental laws, which have redirected health and environmental risks from air
and water to the land. Coping with the risks of carelessly discarded wastes, while
trying to maintain the other aspects of environmental quality and economic %vell-
being, will require a flexible regulatory structure that tries to minimize the costs of
transition between the status quo and the future." Roger C. Dower, Hazardous
Wastes, in Public Policies for Environmental Protection 189 (Paul R. Portey ed.,
1990).
90 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412.
91 42 U.S.C.A. % 74 01-7671q.
92 42 U.S.C.A. § 1317.
93 33 U.S.C.A. % 1251-1387.
94 This is not my point alone. See Page supra note 25, for a full explanation of the
distinctive characteristics of environmental risk as a zero-infinity problem.
95 42 U.S.C.A. §7401 (b)(1).
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accomplished both through the setting of ambient air and water quality
standards and by the use of technology to control emissions. Both of
these statutes therefore attempt to find the optimal level of pollution by
the combination of Quality-Based and Technology-Based Standards.
Whether they are National Uniform Ambient Air Quality
Standards 96 or Water Quality/Effluent Standards, 97 the quality
standards represent the attempt to locate the proper level of pollution
through establishing the minimal level of environmental quality needed
to maintain human health and aesthetic qualities. Although the
traditional "economic" approach to optimal and efficient polluting
makes a distinction between charging a "price" per unit of pollution and
standard setting.98 It can be argued that a performance standard and a
price on polluting are efficiency-equivalent means to the same end:
setting an optimal (i.e. efficient) level of pollution.9 9
Specifically, the quality standard sets the optimal level by defining
how clean the air- or water-shed must be and then issuing permits for
each type of pollutant equal to the level of waste disposal that will
achieve this environmental quality. In essence, the setting of uniform
standards, especially when it is left up to the individual industries to
meet these restrictions, is more efficient than setting a dollar price per
unit of pollution; such price setting requires much more monitoring and
administration to achieve the same result. 10 0 Even if standards are
efficiency-equivalent to prices for pollution, with less administrative
headaches, specific technology standards as opposed to general quality
standards may not be said to grow from a consideration of efficiency.
However, technology-based standards establish mechanical
requirements for each industry and are an attempt to operationalize an
efficient means to attain the ends set by the quality standards. With
concern for Best Achievable Control Technology (BACT), Maximum
Achievable Control Technology (MACT), Reasonably Available
Control Technology (RACT) or Best Conventional Control
Technology (BCT), 10 1 legislation sets technological requirements for
96 42 U.S.C.A. § 7408 (CAA: NAAQS-§108).
97 33 U.S.C.A. § 1311 (CWA: §301).
98 RUFF, supra note 16; Mill & Graves supra note 16.
99 Majone, supra note 9, at 126-33.
100 Id., at 134.
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scrubbers and processes that clean waste before it is emitted into
environmental media.
As quality standards set the efficient ends for the condition of an
environmental media, technology standards mandate specific
equipment that a plant must install as a means to higher quality air or
water. In the beginning, with the Clean Air Act, the focus was on
quality standards. However, with the Clean Water Act just two years
later and in the recent rewriting of both air and water legislation, the
trend has been toward the ascendancy of technological standards. Does
this mean that efficiency is being forsaken?
It is argued that the drift toward technological standards is a
reflection not of the replacement of efficiency with another principle
but its redefinition. The problem faced by federal abatement law in the
last 25 years is twofold. First, it had to retroactively clean up more than
optimal level of pollution produced and piled up over many decades by
the market within the context of TSA-I. Second, federal law had to
establish the means by which an optimal level of pollution (by industry
and media) could be established and maintained over time, factoring in
technological advancement. 10 2 The trend toward reliance on
technological standards must be characterized by the principle that
motivates it. If the primary concern were natural systems and their
intrinsic value, then technology standards could be seen as a means to
that end, but this is not the case.
Under TSA-I, technology set the rate at which humans use the
environment. Technology progressed so quickly that natural systems
were stressed beyond an efficient level by pollution. The market answer
was to let government set the optimal rate of natural systems use (under
TSA-II) and the means to this end was a technology of pollution
abatement to counteract a technology of pollution production.
Technological standards are a way to uniformly internalize
pollution cost across any sector of the production economy. Such
standards require that all current abatement procedures be used to
establish optimum pollution for any particular industry at any particular
101 E.g., under the Clean Water Act, BPT is used for existing point sources; BCT
for conventional pollutants; BAT for toxics; BADT for new sources.
102 Both of these problems have intergenerational implications which are beyond the
scope of this essay, and the principle of efficiency, to analyze.
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time. The law of technology standards focuses upon "conventional,"
"reasonable" and "achievable" technology, and does not judge the
"necessity" of the polluting production process or alternatives to it.
There is no awareness in these standards that particular natural systems
require a particular degree of environmental quality prior to our wants
or that human integrity must have a cleaner environment than present
technology can produce. The focus is on employing available
technology and pronouncing the resulting air or water quality as clean
enough. In effect, as technology standards have eclipsed quality
standards, the setting of the optimal level of pollution has shifted away
from how clean the environment ought to be and become more focused
upon how clean technology can make our manufacturing process, given
current economic and scientific considerations.
One way to understand the seemingly counter-intuitive propensity
for decision-makers and regulators to graft risk regulation onto existing
abatement legislation is the assumption that they believed they were
doing nothing different in abating risk than in abating traditional
pollution. In essence, finding efficient or optimal levels of
contamination consistent with market functioning and an acceptable
materials balance. Given this conceptualization, technological
standards for optimal risk are a conventional, logical, and efficient
solution to toxic air and water contamination.
The only accepted difference within TSA-II is that toxic
contaminants are characterized by greater uncertainty and potential
harm. A concession is made which mandates a more stringent
technological standard for toxic rather than criteria pollutants. For
example, hazardous air pollutants are regulated by the application of
BACT under §112 of the Clean Air Act. However, understanding that
toxins are more hazardous, "best available" technology is still the only
regulation standard. Based on an efficiency principle that does not
recognize a special class of risk in environmental risk dilemmas, it is
necessary to allow the optimal economic use of environmental media.
Section 112 of the Clean Air Act mandates that "in setting hazardous
air pollution standards, EPA is to consider both the beneficial and
adverse economic, environmental, and energy impacts associated with
the standard." 10 3
103 Mary Devine Worobec & Cheryl Hogue, Toxic Substances Controls Guide:
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"Efficient" Environmental Risk Law and Policy
Current environmental law has grown from a meta-policy with a
core principle of economic efficiency and a policy space where
efficiency held pride of place. Within the context of risk abatement, the
statutes and their interpretation have consistently defended markets
from excess regulation whenever possible. Although one can argue that
the statutes examined here have language related to a core of efficiency,
as well as language based on the value of natural systems and human
integrity. I concede that both lines of argument are part of courts'
deliberation, the core principle in legal and policy choice remains either
maximum or optimal efficiency. In terms of leaving the burden of
proof on the regulators, treating each "resource" or media non-
comprehensively from within a market framework and the
consideration of all factors effecting the economy, efficiency becomes
the official standard and justification for legal risk decision-making.
With the conceptualization of environmental risk law and policy
from within the context of TSA-I and TSA-II, the gradual evolution
has been traced from maximum to optimal efficiency where the law
defends TSA-I as long as possible then unwillingly moves to TSA-II.
Due to uncertainty, the courts have been preoccupied with establishing
the parameters of the threshold between TSA-I and II. The "science" of
risk assessment used in defense of TSA-I, protects the market from
false positives. Efforts to find efficiency as optimality, when TSA-II is
established, tend toward implementation of traditional technological
standards and/or the use of efficiency tools, like accounting and
liability law.
The background of environmental law and regulation consists of
economic ideas and ideals. Whether it is the economic definition of
rational choice or the economic calculus applied to risks as symmetric
and preference-based, efficiency requires that risk be regulated in the
market where the public is only protected from extremely hazardous
substances by the application of current technology to establish optimal
levels of risk.
Overall, efficiency remains the core principle of environmental
meta-policy, codified in statutes and reinforced by the courts.
Federal Regulation of Chemical in the Environment 121 (2nd ed. 1992).
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Although a stronger, non-efficiency argument exists in the
environmental meta-policy debate that agrees with Justice Marshall's
dissenting opinion in the Benzene decision that "today's decision will
come to be regarded as an extreme reaction to a regulatory scheme
that, as the Members of the plurality perceived it, imposed an unduly
harsh burden on regulated industries."1 04 Therefore efficiency remains
the core principle of environmental risk law. 10 5 Efficiency dominates
the arguments that form the deliberative strata of environmental meta-
policy allowing it to define what is "reasonable" setting the standards
for law and policy. The long-standing status of efficiency makes it
conventional for legislators, administrators, and courts to think
primarily of the economy when they regulate the environment.
If existing environmental law is ineffective, unfair, unable to solve
problems, 106 and suffers from a piecemeal approach by dividing nature
into sectors for use, 107 it is precisely because of the core principle of
efficiency. Majone 108 contends that the core principle and how it leads
to conceptualizing the policy problem is the most crucial factor in
determining the design of any particular meta-policy. For
environmental risk law, efficiency defines not only the justification for
decision-making but also the standard for success and accountability.
Therefore, if environmental risk law is unreasonable and inadequate, it
is because the fundamental principle of efficiency, at the base of its
policy argument, is an unreasonable and inadequate foundation for the
law of environmental risk.
104 Supra note 42, at 198.
105 Other dissenting opinions in major environmental cases also espouse lines of
argument that are based on environmental values. It is in the dissenting opinions of the
courts that we would expect to find non-core argument attempting to gain the
persuasiveness necessary to become the core of a new environmental meta-policy. See,
e.g., Justice Douglas' dissent in Sierra Club v. Morton 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
106 Dryzek supra note 11, at part I.
107 See Campbell-Mohn, supra note 2, at 51-71.
108 See Majone, supra note 9, at 150-154.
